A Comparative Analysis of Agricultural Productivity Trends in Centrally Planned Countries by Wong, Lung-Fai & Ruttan, Vernon W.
Bulletin  Number 86-4
ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  CENTER
A COMPARATIVE  ANALYSIS  OF
AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTIVITY  TRENDS
IN  CENTRALLY  PLANNED  COUNTRIES
Lung-Fai  Wong  and  Vernon  W.  Ruttan
ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  CENTER
Department  of Economics, Minneapolis
Department  of Agricultural and Applied  Economics, St. Paul







August, 1986A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY
TRENDS  IN CENTRALLY PLANNED COUNTRIES*
Lung-Fai Wong and Vernon W. Ruttan**
*Presented at  the Conference  on Soviet Agriculture and Food System:
A Comparative Perspective, held at  the Kennan Institute, Wilson Center,
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.,  April 2-4,  1986.
**  Vernon W. Ruttan is  a Regents Professor  in the Department of Agricultural
and Applied Economics and  in the Department of  Economics and Adjunct
Professor in  the Hubert H. Humphrey  Institute of  Public Affairs, University
of Minnesota.  He  is  author, with Yujiro  Hayami of Agricultural Development:
An International Perspective,  (Baltimore:  The Johns  Hopkins University
Press,  second  edition,  1985).
**Dr.  Lung-Fai Wong is  legislative analyst and research specialist in  the
Research Department of  the Minnesota House of  Representatives.  He  is
author  of Agricultural Productivity  in the Socialist Countries  (Boulder:
Westview,  1986).  Many of  his works were published in Hong Kong  and China.
In  1984,  as a World Bank McNamara Fellow, Dr. Wong was  teaching agricultural
development in  the Bejing Agricultural University and  conducting research
on the  Chinese agricultural production responsibility system.
The research, on which this paper  is based,  is  in part supported by the
Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Minnesota, Project #14062.
The University of Minnesota  is  committed to  the policy  that all persons
shall have equal access  to  its programs, facilities, and  employment
without regard to race, religion, color,  sex, national origin, handicap,
age, or veteran status.A Comparative Analysis of Agricultural Productivity
Trends in Centrally Planned Countries
Lung-Fai Wong and Vernon Ruttan*
I.  Introduction
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  compare  the  differences  in  agricultural  productivity
changes  between  nine  centrally  planned  countries  - Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  East
Germany,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  Yugoslavia,  the  Soviet  Union,  and  China  for  the
period  1950-1980.  Two  kinds  of  productivity  indices  - the  partial  productivity  and  the
total  factor  productivity  - were  constructed  for  this  study.  Although  labor  productivity
and  land  productivity  are  expressions  of  output  per  unit  of  a  single  input,  they  are  major
components  of  total  factor  productivity  which  is  commonly  used  as  an  indicator  of
technical  change.  The  two  partial  productivity  ratios  also  serve  as  indicators  of  the
direction of technological  change.
Although  the  nine  countries  included  in  this  study  are  generally  labelled  as
Centrally  Planned  Economies  (CPE),  which  implies  homogeneity,  they  are  in  fact  different
from  each  other  in  terms  of  the  degree  of  centralization,  agrarian  policy,  resource
endowments,  and  growth  pattern.  As  shown  in  Figures  1  and  2,  the  growth  rate  of
agricultural  output  varies  among  the  nine  centrally  planned  countries,  which  also  lead  to
the varies pattern of productivity changes.
The  study,  on  which  this  paper  draws,  is  a  part  of  a  larger  on-going  project  on
comparative  productivity-  growth  among  countries.  (Hayami  and  Ruttan  1981  &  1985,
Binswanger  and  Ruttan  1978,  Hayami,  Ruttan  and  Southworth,  1979).  This  paper  reports
the  results  of  an  effort  to  measure  and  compare  rate  of  change  in  partial  and  totalFigure  1
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60Q  - I  ,productivity  for  the  agricultural  sector  in  nine  centrally  planned  countries.  Using  a  set
of  statistically  estimated  factor  shares  and  the  geometric  index  approach,  a  series  of
total  factor  productivity  indices  are  constructed.  Analysis  of  the  trends  of  productivity
changes  and  contribution  of  technical  changes  to  agricultural  growth  are  also  presented
here.1
II.  Changes in Labor Productivity
Following  the  notation  used  in  previous  studies  (Wong  and  Ruttan  1983),  labor
productivity  is  defined  in  terms  of  wheat  units  per  agricultural  labor,  including  male  and
female  workers.  This  non-traditional  definition  has  a  special  purpose  for  a  cross-country
comparison  study.  Not  only  does  it  allow  comparison  between  countries  that  have
different  price  structures,  currencies,  and  output  compositions,  but  the  biases  stemming
from exchange rates can also be avoided.2
Labor  productivity  for  the  nine  CPEs  included  in  this  study  are  computed  and
summarized  in  Table  1. During  the  last  three  decades,  the  ranking  of  labor  productivity
altered  variously  among  these  countries.  Although  the  ranking  for  East  Germany
(highest),  Yugoslavia,  Romania,  and  China  (lowest)  remained  the  same,  while  there  were
shifts in rankings among other countries.
The  most  obvious  is  the  ranking  of  Hungary.  In  1950,  Hungary  was  the  fifth  among
the  group;  it  climbed  to  second  position  in  1980.  In  contrast,  during  the  same  period,  the
ranking  of  Poland  slipped  from  third  to  sixth.  Bulgaria  performed  almost  as  well  as
Hungary  - it  gained  two  positions  in  the  race.  The  other  two  countries,  USSR  and
Czechoslovakia, each lost one position.
The  shifts  in  relative  ranking  only  reflect  differences  in  relative  growth  rates.  All
nine  countries  achieved  very  substantial  absolute  increases  in  labor  productivity  during
this  period.  Even  China,  which  has  the  lowest  labor  productivity,  increased  82  percent
3Table 1:  Labor Productivity, wheat units per labor
YEAR  BUL  CZE  GDR  HUN  POL  ROM  YUG  USSR  PRC
m•,  ~~·~I  I  II  I  I  II  I  I  I  m--~
2.43  7.16  11.36
3.54  7.66  13.51
2.76  7.87  14.02
3.45  8.74  14.12
2.90  7.76  14.43
3.24  8.31  12.81
2.95  9.11  13.71
3.59  9.00  14.71
3.46  8.98  15.21
4.38  9.15  15.27
4.69  10.69  19.86
4.53  11.00  15.48
5.06  10.96  17.93
5.28  12.27  17.94
6.19  12.78  18.85
7.37  12.13  21.15
8.95  14.32  21.72
8.90  14.96  24.40
8.67  16.03  25.47
9.49  16.52  24.52
9.97  16.81  26.32
10.72  18.07  26.76
12.07  20.04  30.91
11.99  21.93  31.54
11.56  23.06  35.22
13.46  22.45  33.54
15.12  22.42  32.72
14.55  24.83  35.56
15.65  26.69  37.19
16.89  24.96  37.24
16.46  27.12  37.19
5.27  6.08  1.67  1.71
6.53  5.42  2.29  2.59
4.61  5.42  2.04  1.54
6.42  5.58  2.48  2.75
5.96  6.12  2.29  2.29
6.97  5.98  2.60  3.06
6.16  6.83  2.11  2.48
7.13  6.92  2.66  3.76
6.78  7.09  2.19  3.14
8.28  7.03  2.82  4.36
7.99  7.65  2.64  3.96
8.38  8.46  2.85  3.87
8.89  7.61  2.64  4.10
9.60  8.21  2.76  4.46
10.26  8.39  2.91  4.88
12.73  8.70  3.14  4.59
13.70  9.11  3.69  5.64
14.09  9.62  3.65  5.57
14.21  10.04  3.58  5.49
15.39  9.58  3.71  6.15
14.91  9.76  3.21  5.75
17.55  9.47  4.03  6.49
19.30  10.42  4.56  6.53
20.55  11.10  4.29  6.96
22.65  11.12  4.42  8.13
22.95  11.64  4.56  8.19
22.96  12.21  5.79  8.84
25.57  11.50  5.67  9.46
26.60  12.81  5.84  9.04































































60-69  9.37  5.16  4.61  7.99  2.87  4.38  5.20  4.37  4.11
70-80  5.24  4.33  3.43  5.36  2.62  6.02  5.24  1.81  1.87
50-80  6.80  4.73  4.13  6.04  2.88  3.82  5.44  3.83  1.53
60-80  6.70  5.04  4.36  6.43  2.53  4.51  4.87  3.30  2.40
Source:  Compiled by authors.
27.44  11.61  6.28  9.65  15.14  2.39from  1950-1980.  Among  these  countries,  Bulgaria  had  the  highest  jump  in  1960-1980,  a
250  percent  increase  in  labor  productivity.  Following  Bulgaria  was  Hungary,
Czechoslovakia,  Yugoslavia,  Romania,  USSR,  East  Germany,  China,  and  Poland,  in  that
order.
The  rate  of  growth  for  labor  productivity  was  also  computed  for  the  periods
1960-1969,  1970-1980,  1950-1980,  and  1960-1980.3  As  shown  at  the  bottom  of  Table  1,
most  countries  (except  Romania  and  Yugoslavia)  experienced  a  higher  growth  rate  of
labor  productivity  in  the  1960s  than  in  the  1970s.  Overall,  the  average  growth  rate  for
these  countries  for  the  period  of  1960-1980  was  4.46  percent,  which  is  higher  than  most
people would expect.
One  of  the  explanations  for  the  high  growth  in  labor  productivity  is  the  high
growth  of  aggregate  agricultural  production  of  2.91  percent  average  of  the  nine  CPEs  for
the  period  1960-1980  (Wong  1986;  11).  When  the  size  of  the  labor  force  remained
constant  or  decreased,  the  growth  of  production  naturally  translated  to  the  growth  of
labor productivity.
Another  important  source  of  growth  of  labor  productivity  has  been  the  shrinking
size  of  labor  forces  in  the  agricultural  sector  in  these  countries.  All  East  European
countries  experienced  a  large  reduction  in  the  agricultural  labor  force  between  1950  and
1980.  For  example,  the  agricultural  labor  force  in  Bulgaria  in  1980  was  only  37  percent  of
the  1950  level  - it  was  a  46  percent  reduction  for  Czechoslovakia;  56  percent  reduction
for  East  Germany;  47  percent  reduction  for  Hungary;  80  percent  reduction  for  Poland;
and 59 percent reduction for Yugoslavia.
The  causes  of  the  sharp  decreases  in  agricultural  labor  in  East  European  countries
can  be  traced  to  both  the  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  sectors.  In  the  early  1960s,
the  process  of  collectivization  in  agriculture  in  most  of  these  countries  resulted  in  a
massive  movement  of population  to  the  urban  areas  (Vais  1981;  239).  Simultaneously,  many
5East  European  countries  suffered  serve  economic  problems.  To  counteract  the  declining
economy,  policy  makers  sought  to  expand  production  capacity  through  construction  of
new  factories  and  an  increase  in  the  demand  for  labor  force.  This  resulted  in  a  massive
tapping  of  male  and  female  labor  from  the  agricultural  sector.  This  situation  continued
through  the  1970s  when  labor  shortage  was  still  a  problem.4  Thus,  East  European
countries  had  been  using  agriculture  as  a  reservoir  of  manpower  for  the  non-agricultural
sector.
The  rate  of  reduction  of  the  labor  force  in  the  USSR  was  not  as  large  as  in  the
East  European  countries.  The  size  of  the  productive  labor  force  declined  by  only  18
percent  from  1950-1980,  which  is  a  smaller  percentage  than  that  of  any  East  European
countries.  But  having  a  sizeable  agricultural  labor  force  per  se  is  not  the  major  cause  of
low  labor  productivity.  In  fact,  a  large  part  of  the  country,  especially  the  European  part
of  the  USSR,  has  been  experiencing  a  shortage  of  agricultural  labor.  Also,  it  is
increasingly  common  in  Soviet  agriculture  to  use  temporary  workers  and  factory  workers
during  the  peak  seasons.  But  this  does  not  stop  the  out-migration  of  agricultural  labor.
The  inferior  wage  rate  in  the  agricultural  sector  is  the  major  cause  of  out-migration.
According  to  Brooks'  calculation,  in  nine  of  the  fifteen  Soviet  republics,  the  ratios  of
average  non-agricultural  wages  to  agricultural  wages  in  1965  were  close  to  2.0  or  above.
In Georgia republic, the ratio was as high as 2.68 (Johnson and Brooks  1983;  182).
Theoretically,  labor  mobility  is  a  mechanism  for  equalizing  the  differential  wage
rates  that  exist  in  the  economy.  But  this  has  not  happened  in  the  Soviet  economy.  The
educated,  young  and  energetic  farmers  who  were  supposed  to  take  responsibility  for  the
process  of  "complex  mechanization",  as  Soviets  refer  to  it,  have  migrated  out  of  the
agricultural  sector  and  left  behind  them  the  unskilled,  untrained,  aged  population  of
agricultural  laborers.  This  has  generated  additional  problems  as  tractors  and  machinery
are  left  idle  because  of  a  shortage  of  trained  operators  and  experienced  technicians.
6Thus,  the  out-migration  of  young  and  trained  people  from  the  agricultural  sector  to  the
non-agricultural  sector  is  an  impediment  to  the  growth  of  labor  productivity  and  to
narrowing the wage gap.
The  causes  of  slow  growth  in  China's  agricultural  labor  productivity  are  completely
different.  Unlike  the  East  European  countries  and  the  Soviet  Union,  China  has  faced  a
growing  rural  population  which  was  sizeable  to  begin  with.  The  rural  population  increased
from  approximately  500  million  in  1952  to  780  million  in  1977  (Tang  1980;  43).  This  added
127.8  million  workers  to  China's  agricultural  labor  force  in  the  period  of  1950-1980,
which  is  a  77  percent  jump.  Despite  the  resulting  decrease  in  land/man  ratio,  the  labor
productivity  of  wheat  units  per  labor  in  Chinese  agriculture  increased  64  percent  between
1960 and  1980.
China's  labor  productivity  continued  to  grow  through  the  1970s,  but  the  development
and  adoption  of  labor-intensive  cultivation  and  the  pressure  to  raise  unit  area  output
resulted  in  the  slow  growth  of  labor  productivity.  Furthermore,  the  commune
establishment  in  China  required  members  to  contribute  a  significant  amount  of  time  to
non-farming  tasks  such  as  building  schools,  roads,  dams,  etc.  Consequently,  labor
productivity  in  China  is  the  lowest  among  socialist  countries,  both  in  terms  of
productivity  level and growth rate of productivity.
From  the  data  in  Tables  1,  three  general  patterns  can  be  observed.  First,  the  three
most  industrialized  countries  (East  Germany,  Hungary,  and  Czechoslovakia)  have  the
highest  level  of  labor  productivity.  Second,  the  differences  in  labor  productivity  between
these  countries  are  large  and  are  continuing  to  grow.  In  1960,  labor  productivity  in  East
Germany  was  13.6  times  that  of  China.  This  ratio  grew  to  15.56  times  by  1980  - a  14.4
percent  increase.  Third,  even  though  there  has  been  much  discussion  about  the  favorable
effects  of  decentralization,  labor  productivity  data  cannot  be  interpreted  as  supporting
7the  hypothesis  that  the  less-centralized  countries  (Hungary,  Poland,  Yugoslavia,  and
Romania)  have out-performed  the centralized countries.
III.  Changes in Land Productivity
Land  productivity,  measured  in  wheat  units  per  hectare,  is  presented  in  Table  2.  It
represents  only  the  physical  relationships  between  production  and  land  and  should  not  be
used  as  an  indicator  of  performance.  However,  land  productivity  can  be  used  as  a  useful
indicator  of  agricultural  productivity  and  agricultural  development  in  areas  where  land  is
a constrained resource as in the Asian countries.
In  contrast  to  the  fluctuation  of  labor  productivity,  the  overall  picture  of  land
productivity  is  fairly  stable.  The  data  in  Table  2  show  that  from  1950-1980  only  four  of
the  nine  countries  had  changes  in  their  rankings  of  land  productivity  and  they  were
small  changes.  Furthermore,  ranking  of  the  four  highest  countries  in  land  productivity
and  labor  productivity  in  1980  are  identical,  which  includes  East  Germany,  Hungary,
Czechoslovakia,  and  Bulgaria.  Note  that  the  low  level  of  land  productivity  in  the  USSR  is
partly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  USSR  has  a  vast  area  of  uncultivated  agricultural  land
(so does China) which is also defined in this study as agricultural land.
During  the  past  three  decades,  land  productivity  in  all  nine  centrally  planned
countries  has  increased  substantially  in  that  period.  A  summary  of  the  annual  growth  rate
of land productivity for different periods of time are reported in Table 2.
The  growth  rates  of  land  productivity  were  larger  in  1960-1969  than  in  1970-1980
for  the  majority  of the  nine  countries.  It  also  should  be  noted  that  in  most  countries  the
growth  rate  of  land  productivity  was  smaller  than  the  growth  rate  of  labor  productivity.
The reasons for slow growth of land productivity are not difficult to identify.Table  2:  Land Productivity, wheat units per hectare
YEAR  BUL  CZE  GDR  HUN  POL  ROM  YUG  USSR  PRC
1950  1.18  1.97  2.58  1.50  1.61  0.73  0.69  0.27  0.66
1951  1.67  1.98  3.06  1.85  1.44  0.98  1.02  0.24  0.75
1952  1.27  1.96  3.22  1.29  1.44  0.88  0.59  0.28  0.89
1953  1.60  2.26  3.23  1.71  1.48  1.07  1.03  0.28  0.95
1954  1.33  2.02  3.38  1.56  1.62  1.00  0.83  0.27  1.02
1955  1.52  2.17  3.13  1.88  1.58  1.22  1.08  0.32  1.08
1956  1.40  2.34  3.21  1.70  1.80  0.95  0.85  0.36  1.13
1957  1.69  2.24  3.32  2.01  1.82  1.20  1.27  0.34  1.15
1958  1.68  2.16  3.45  1.89  1.86  0.99  1.04  0.40  1.19
1959  1.97  2.15  3.26  2.22  1.84  1.28  1.42  0.38  1.03
1960  1.92  2.35  3.79  2.07  1.99  1.23  1.27  0.38  0.88
1961  1.84  2.24  2.87  1.98  2.22  1.28  1.21  0.40  0.86
1962  o191  2.18  3.33  2.11  2.01  1.17  1.27  0.41  0.91
1963  1.93  2.42  3.34  2.18  2.18  1.22  1.37  0.38  1.01
1964  2.17  2.61  3.51  2.25  2.24  1.28  1.47  0.46  1.12
1965  2.25  2.13  3.72  2.32  2.31  1.39  1.36  0.43  1.22
1966  2.64  2.51  3.72  2.48  2.41  1.59  1.64  0.51  1.32
1967  2.56  2.57  4.10  2.52  2.55  1.57  1.60  0.50  1.33
1968  2.37  2.71  4.14  2.53  2.65  1.52  1.55  0.52  1.25
1969  2.40  2.76  3.85  2.70  2.56  1.57  1.70  0.50  1.32
1970  2.42  2.79  4.00  2.56  2.60  1.37  1.56  0.57  1.47
1971  2.50  2.96  3.96  2.95  2.52  1.69  1.74  0.56  1.51
1972  2.74  3.09  4.39  3.17  2.77  1.91  1.72  0.54  1.51
1973  2.64  3.28  4.39  3.27  2.97  1.79  1.81  0.65  1.59
1974  2.45  3.43  4.82  3.51  3.00  1.84  2.07  0.61  1.69
1975  2.69  3.28  4.54  3.47  2.95  1.87  2.05  0.54  1.78
1976  2.75  3.22  4.35  3.39  3.04  2.35  2.18  0.64  1.78
1977  2.54  3.49  4.70  3.73'  2.81  2.28  2.29  0.62  1.86
1978  2.66  3.69  4.94  3.88  3.07  2.31  2.14  0.68  1.97
1979  2.87  3.44  4.94  3.71  3.00  2.41  2.20  0.61  2.14
1980  2.76  3.77  4.94  4.08  2.64  2.41  2.20  0.63  2.20
GROWTH RATES:
60-69  3.77  2.13  2.50  3.28  3.05  3.48  3.62  3.71  5.49
70-80  1.05  2.45  2.11  3.71  0.90  5.04  3.49  1.35  4.16
50-80  2.67  2.16  1.79  3.31  2.61  3.39  3.65  3.23  3.16
60-80  1.90  2.74  2.18  3.67  1.97  3.75  3.19  2.75  4.48
Source:  Compiled by authors.First,  the  growth  of population  in  all  East  European  countries  and  the  Soviet  Union
was  small,  and  in  some  "cases the  growth  rate  was  negative  (such  as  in  East  Germany).
Thus,  the  pressure  for  raising  per  area  production  was  not  as  acute  as  it  was  in
countries  in  which  there  was  increasing  population  pressure  (such  as  China).  Second,  the
land/labor  ratio  in  these  countries  increased  in  1950-1980  which  implies  that  a  unit  of
labor  had  more  land  to  cultivate  than  before.  This  eventually  led  to  the  adoption  of
technology  which  was  less  labor  intensive.  Third,  the  mechanization  program  in  East
European  countries  and  the  Soviet  Union  opened  some  new  agricultural  land  which
further  increase  the  land/labor  ratio  and  at  the  same  time  more  agricultural  land  was
used  for  operation  of  machinery  rather  than  for  planting.  And  fourth,  because  land  was
owned  by  the  state  and  rented  to  state  and  collective  farms  at  a  minimal  charge,  there
was  little  incentive  for  farmers  or  managers  of  state  farms  to  maximize  either  the
utilization  of  land  or  the  value  of  the  marginal  product  of  land.  This  was  not  the  case
when the land was designated  to individual farmers as private garden plots.
The  situation  in  China  was  the  reverse.  The  increasing  population  in  China,  from
552  million  in  1950  to  987  million  in  1980,  created  enormous  pressure  on  the  agricultural
sector  to  produce  more  food  for  the  newly  added  population.  The  increase  in  total  food
consumption  and  the  decrease  in  land/labor  ratio  led  the  Chinese  to  utilize  their  land
with  greater  intensity.  With  experience  that  had  accumulated  over  several  centuries,
Chinese  peasants  learned  how  to  produce  an  increasing  amount  of  food  from  a  smaller
amount of land per worker.
Rawski  pointed  out  that  two  schemes  were  used  in  China  in  an  effort  to  raise
output  per  unit  of  land.  The  first  scheme  was  the  intensification  of  cropping  practices.
Over  the  past  three  decades,  the  application  of  resources  to  each  unit  of  sown  hectare,
in  the  absence  of  changes  in  the  type  of  crops  grown  or  in  the  rotation  cycle,  has  been
increasing.  This  intensification  increases  the  level  of  activity  in  land  preparation,
10planting,  transplanting,  and  crop  management,  which  absorbs  a  large  number  of  the
underemployed  rural population.
The  second  scheme  is  the  intensification  of  the  cropping  cycle.  This  refers  to  an
increase  in  the  number  of  crops  harvested  per  unit  of  cultivated  land.  According  to
Rawski,  the  national  index  of  multiple  cropping  in  China  (sown  area  divided  by  cultivated
area)  has risen from 1.31 in 1952 to 1.5 in  1977 or 1978 (Rawski  1982;  125).
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  intensive  use  of  labor  and  other  factor  inputs  such  as
fertilizer  in  Chinese  agriculture  has  been  the  major  cause  of  the  relatively  high  growth
rate  of  land  productivity.  In  fact,  the  growth  rate  of  land  productivity  in  China  is  even
larger than the growth rate of its labor productivity.
To  summarize  this  section,  several  observations  are  worth  mentioning.  The  three
industrialized  countries  (East  Germany,  Hungary,  and  Czechoslovakia)  have  the  highest
level  of  land  productivity.  The  differences  in  land  productivity  between  countries  are
smaller  than  labor  productivity  and  are  shrinking  over  time.  Apparently  it  has  been  easier
to  improve  labor  productivity  than  to  improve  land  productivity.  With  the  exception  of
China,  none  of  the  countries  included  in  this  study  have  been  able  to  double  their  land
productivity in the last 20 years.
In  spite  of  the  common  perception  that  the  growth  of  agricultural  production  in
CPE  has  been  rather  slow,  analysis  presented  in  this  study  indicates  that  the  labor
productivity  of  the  nine  countries,  including  the  highly  populated  China,  has  increased  by
at  least  60  percent  for  the  period  of  1960-1980.  Industrial  inputs  have  played  an
increasingly  important  role  in  agricultural  production.  For  example,  from  1960  to  1980  the
consumption  of  chemical  fertilizer  in  Romania  and  China  increased  16  and  19  times,
respectively.  The  number  of  tractors  in  Yugoslavia  and  China  increased  12  and  16  times,
respectively.
11Except  for  China,  the  rate  of  growth  of  labor  productivity  has  been  faster  than  the
rate  of  growth  of  land  productivity  in  these  countries.  Despite  the  fact  that  total
agricultural  area  in  the  East  European  countries  has  decreased  (or  remained  unchanged),
the  USSR  and  East  European  countries  have  emphasized  mechanical  technology  in  order
to  increase  their  labor  productivity,  while  China  has  concentrated  on  labor-intensive
biological technology to intensify land use.
IV.  Cross-Country Comparison of Total Factor Productivity
The  biased  character  of  the  partial  productivity  indices  as  indicators  of  technical
progress  motivated  the  employment  of  total  factor  productivity  which  is  defined  as  the
ratio  of  aggregate  output  to  the  aggregate  of  all  inputs.  Because  the  total  factor
productivity  captures  the  effects  of  factor  substitution,  it  represents  a  more  adequate
indicator of the effects of technical change.
It  has  been  conventional  since  the  mid-1950s,  to  follow  Solow  in  using  geometric
index  as  to  measure  total  factor  productivity.  Assuming  a  linearly  homogeneous
production  function,  competitive  equilibrium  and  neutral  technical  change,  the  residual  or
unexplained  growth  can  be  treated  as  an  index  of  technical  change,  and  can  be  measured
econometrically.  The  mathematical  expression  for  the  geometric  productivity  index  with
five conventional factor inputs is as follows:
12*  0  *  *  *  *
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where
A = shift factor,
y = output per labor (Y/N),
1  = land per labor (L/N),
f = fertilizer per labor (F/N),
m = machinery per labor (M/N),
s = livestock per labor (S/N),
Wi=  factor share of corresponding factor
In  the  event  that  discrete  annual  data  is  used,  the  above  equation  can  be
approximated as:
AA  AY  A1   Af  Am   As --  =  - - W-  - W-  - W  - - W--
A  y  1  f  m  s
where  Ay = (yt+,-  Yt)  and etc.
t  = 1950,...,1979
Thus,  (AA(t)/A(t))  can  be  obtained  from  the  above  equation  which  is  the  yearly  shift
factor of the production function.
The  procedure  for  obtaining  a  series  of  annual  geometric  productivity  indices  is
first  to  compute  the  term  (AA/A)  for  each  year.  Then  by  arbitrary  setting  A(1950)=1,  the
time series of cumulated shift factor A(t) can be approximated by
A(t+l) = A(t)*[l+(AA(t)/A(t))]
t = 1950,...,  1979
Complete  price  information  was  not  available  for  all  nine  CPEs  and  if  they  were
available  they  would  be  seriously  distorted  and  would  fail  to  reflect  the  actual  resources
scarcity.  Thus,  factor  shares  cannot  be  estimated  directly.  Instead,  a  set  of  statistically
estimated  production  elasticities  was  used  as  a  proxy  for  factor  shares.  The  estimated
production  elasticities  were  from  the  estimated  agricultural  metaproduction  function  for
socialist  countries.5   Compared  with  other  studies  summarized  in  Table  3,  all  of  the
13estimated  production  elasticities  fall  into  a  reasonable  range.  Thus,  the  factor  shares
used  are  the  estimated  production  elasticities  of  socialist  agricultural  metaproduction
function  which  are:  0.155  for  labor,  0.042  for  land,  0.239  for  fertilizer,  0.173  for
machinery,  and  0.391  for  livestock  (Wong  1986;37).  A  summary  of  the  computed  indices
are  presented  in  Table  4  together  with  the  annual  growth  rate  of  the  indices  for  the
period of 1950-1980,  the sub-periods  of 1960-1970, 1970-1980,  and 1960-1980.
The  geometric  productivity  indices  A(t)  which  Solow  called  "a  rough  profile"  of
technical  change,  show  some  signs  of  decreasing  trends  of  productivity  in  the  1950s  and
1960s.  The  decreasing  trend  of  total  factor  productivity  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  the
increasing  trends  of  labor  productivity  and  land  productivity.  Except  for  Czechoslovakia
and  East  Germany,  all  countries  experienced  negative  growth  rates  in  total  factor
productivity  during  all  of  the  periods.  The  negative  growth  rate  was  particularly  serious
in  Bulgaria,  Romania,  and  the  USSR.  In  the  1970s,  after  some  major  economic  reform  in
agriculture,  the  negative  growth  rate  started  to  slow  down.  In  fact,  during  the  early
1970s,  Czechoslovakia  and  East  Germany  were  able  to  regain  some  growth  in  total  factor
productivity  and  achieve  positive  growth  in  the  sub-period  of  1970-1980.  A  similar
decreasing  trend  for  the  Soviet  Union  was  reported  by  Douglas  Diamond  (Diamond  1983;
146).  He  reported  that  the  total  factor  productivity  index  in  Soviet  agriculture  declined
from 2.1 in 1951-1960 to  1.0 in 1961-1970, and down to 0.2 in 1971-1979.
Beginning  in  the  1970s,  four  countries  managed  to  pull  out  of  the  downward  trend
and  achieve  a  modest  positive  growth  rate  in  the  sub-period  1970-1980.  Overall,  two  of
the  nine  countries  had  positive  growth  rates  in  the  sub-period  1960-1980.  Most  noticeable
was  the  1.82  annual  growth  rate  of  East  Germany  in  the  sub-period  1970-1980.  Perhaps  a
critical  factor  in  the  reversal  of  declining  productivity  in  East  European  countries  was  a
series  of  economic  reforms  that  took  place  during  the  1960s.  The  reforms  were  designed
in  an  attempt  to  make  the  centralized  planning  system  less  rigid  and  the  administration
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53more  flexible.  The  reforms  were  also  intended  to  change  the  terms  of  trade  in  favor  of
agriculture.
The  declining  total  factor  productivity  index  in  China  can  be  checked  with  the
figures  estimated  by  Anthony  Tang  (Tang  1980;  75).  Using  a different  aggregate  procedure
and  a  different  set  of  factor  shares  (0.54  for  labor,  0.27  for  land,  0.11  for  capital  inputs,
and  0.08  for  current  inputs),  Tang  estimated  that  the  total  factor  productivity  in  China's
agricultural  sector  declined  19  percent  during  the  period  of  1952-1977  (Tang  1980;  28).  On
the  other  hand,  using  the  same  weights  as  Tang's,  Rawski  also  estimated  that  total  factor
productivity  in  Chinese  agriculture  declined  26  to  36  percent  between  1957  and  1975
(Rawski  1983;  132).  Although  the  declining  trend  was  not  reversed,  the  rate  of  negative
growth  after  the  1960s  was  considerably  smaller  than  in  the  1950s.  The  fluctuation  of
trends  and  the  inconsistency  between  partial  and  total  factor  productivity  indices  is
intriguing.  In  the  next  section,  an  in-depth  examination  of  the  different  trends  of
productivity indices is presented for the nine centrally planned countries.
One  final  note  about  the  model  of  geometric  index.  When  deriving  the  geometric
index,  Solow  imposed  a  critical  assumption  of  neutral  technical  change.  His  definition  of
neutrality  means  that  the  shifts  in  production  function  are  pure  scale  changes,  leaving
marginal rates of substitution unchanged at given capital/labor ratios (Solow  1957; 316).
To  ensure  that  data  used  in  this  study  does  not  violate  the  neutrality  assumption,
scatterplots  of  the  yearly  shift  factors  against  the  land/labor  ratio  (L/N)  were  examined.
From  the  scatterplots,  no  trace  of  relationship  was  detected  between  technical  progress
and  input  ratios.  The  statistical  technique  of  Ordinary  Least  Squares  was  also  used  in  an
attempt  to  estimate  this  relationship.  The  statistics  tests  did  not  lead  to  a  rejection  of
the  assumption  of  neutral  technical  change.6  Thus,  it  may  be  formally  concluded  that
technical  change  in  the  nine  centrally  planned  countries  did  not  alter  the  marginal  rates
of  substitution  between  inputs.  Therefore,  the  use  of  Solow's  model  for  this  study  does
17not  appear  to  grossly  violate  the  assumption  of  neutral  technical  change.  The  question  of
neutrally  will,  however,  be  examined  more  vigorously  in  a  test  of  the  induced  innovation
hypothesis that is now being initiated.
V.  Trends of Total Factor Productivity
The  trends  and  fluctuations  of  total  factor  productivity  in  different  countries  can
be  easily  observed  in  Figures  3  to  11  for  individual  countries.  In  most  countries,  the
differences  between  partial  productivity  and  total  factor  productivity  index  tend  to
diverge,  though  not  necessarily,  in  the  opposite  direction.  Furthermore,  except  for  China,
the  divergence  between  labor  productivity  and  total  factor  productivity  is  greater  than
the  divergence  between  land  productivity  and  total  factor  productivity.  These  divergences
are  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  historical  experience  of  other  western  countries  where
partial and total productivity moved in the same direction.
The  figures  presented  highlighted  the  differences  in  agricultural  productivity
between  CPEs.  The  differences  in  labor  and  land  productivity  among  these  countries  are
indeed  great.  Measured  in  wheat  units,  agricultural  output  per  labor  ranged  from  1.46
(China)  to  19.86  (E.Germany)  in  1960  and  from  2.39  (China)  to 37.19  (E.Germany)  in  1980.
The  agricultural  output  per  hectare,  measured  in-wheat  units,  ranged  from  0.38  (USSR)  to
3.79 (East Germany) in 1960 and 0.63 (USSR) to 4.94 (East Germany) in 1980.
The  differences  in  agricultural  productivity  among  non-centrally  planned  countries
are  even  greater.  In  1980,  labor  productivity  ranged  from  3.11  (India)  to  285.06  (USA),
and  land  productivity  ranged  from  0.15  (Australia)  to  12.23  (Japan).  The  differences  of
such  a  comparison  can  be  observed  in  Figure  12  and  13  where  the  agricultural  labor  and
agricultural  land  productivity  for  the  CPEs  are  plotted  on  Figure  12,  and  together  with
24 non-centrally planned countries, plotted on Figure  13.7
18Figure  3
Trends  of  Productivity for  Bulgaria
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240Figure  12  :  Comparison  of  Productivity  Trends  Among
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RAs  shown  in  Figure  13,  the  pattern  of  agricultural  productivity  growth  in  the  nine
centrally  planned  countries  also  diverges  to  three  different  paths  that  are  similar  to
those  observed  by  Hayami  and  Ruttan  (1971;  69).  Extended  outward  from  the  origin,  the
three  paths  can  be  classified  as:  (a)  the  path  characterized  by  the  group  of  countries
with  the  new  continents  including  New  Zealand,  Australia,  Canada,  and  the  U.S.A.,  where
favorable  man/land  ratios  prevail;  (b)  the  path  characterized  by  Asian  countries  where
unfavorable  man/land  ratios  prevail,  including  such  countries  as  Japan  and  China;  and  (c)
the  path  characterized  by  European  countries,  both  in  the  East  and  the  West,  where
relative factor endowments are between the (a)  and (b) groups.
These  growth  patterns  indicate  the  different  processes  of  agricultural  growth  under
alternative  man/land  ratios  common  in  both  centrally  planned  and  non-centrally  planned
countries.  The  relative  availability  of  resources  in  the  agricultural  sector  not  only
determines  the  growth  pattern,  it  is  also  the  source  of  differences  in  land  and  labor
productivity between centrally planned and non-centrally planned countries.
VI.  Contribution of Technical Change in Agricultural  Growth
Decreasing  total  factor  productivity  and  increasing  labor  and  land  partial
productivity  characterize  the  performance  of  agriculture  in  the  CPEs.  Moreover,  despite
the  fact  that  the  average  annual  growth  rate  of  aggregate  agricultural  production  in
these  countries  is  not  low,  several  countries  have  difficulty  maintaining  growth  at  a  level
consistent  with  the  rate  of  growth  in  demand.  Although  growth  in  agricultural  production
can  be* achieved  by  replicating  the  existing  level  of  factor  inputs,  this  growth  would  be
very  costly  to  the  economy.  Another  source  of  growth  would  be  to  increase  productivity,
but this does not come easily.
Over  the  last  three  decades,  there  have  been  several  factors  identified  as  sources  of
agricultural  growth  in  the  nine  centrally  planned  countries.  First,  the  Soviet  Union
26expanded  their  sown  acreage.  Second,  East  European  countries  and  the  USSR  invested
heavily  in  fertilizer  and  irrigation  systems  in  an  effort  to  raise  yield  per  hectare.  Third,
the  Chinese  intensified  their  use  of  land  by  multiple  cropping  and  labor-intensive
farming.  Also  in  the  Soviet  Union,  change  in  the  efficiency  of  converting  feed  into
livestock  products  as  well  as  the  increase  in  feed  available  for  output  of  livestock
products  due  to  reduction  in  use  of  draft  animals  were  both  sources  of  total  agricultural
output growth as cited in the literature (Diamond, Bettis, Ramsson  1983;  146).
The  sources  of  growth  in  agricultural  production  from conventional  inputs  is  not  too
difficult  to  identify.  It  has,  however,  been  more  difficult  to  adequately  characterize  the
rate  of  technical  change.  The  generation  of  technological  change  is  a  costly,  resource
using  activity.  The  evidence  of  declining  total  factor  productivity  suggests  that  the
increases  of  agricultural  output  have  been  achieved  by  increasing  use  of  conventional
inputs more rapidly than growth in output.
The  divergence  between  total  factor  productivity  and  partial  productivity  suggests
that  there  has  been  a  slow  or  even  negative  shift  in  the  production  function.  In  order  to
examine  the  different  degrees  of  contribution  by  technical  change,  Table  5  was  tabulated
for the nine centrally planned countries.
The  first  two  rows  of  Table  5  are  labor  productivity  in  1960  and  1980,  respectively.
The  difference  between  row  1  and  row  2  is  the  gross  growth  caused  by  increases  in
inputs  and/or  technological  advances  during  1960-1980,  as  shown  in  row  3.  Row  4  is  the
total  factor  productivity  in  1980  (from  Table  4)  which  is  a  indicator  of  technical  change
during  the  period  1960-1980.  Hence,  the  "constant  technology"  labor  productivity  in  1980
can  be  obtained  by  dividing  row  2  with  row  4,  as  shown  in  Row  5.  It can  be  interpreted
as  the  productivity,  net  of  technical  change,  that  would  have  occurred  in  1980  should
technology  remained  constant.  In  other  words,  it  is  the  increase  in  productivity  that
caused  solely  by  the  increase  of  inputs.  For  example,  the  1980  labor  productivity  for
27Table 5:  Contribution of Technici
BUL  CZE
Labor productivity:
(1)=Y/N,  1960  4.69  10.69
(2)=Y/N,  1980  16.46  27.12
Gross growth:
(3)-(2)-(1)  11.77  16.43
Technology index:
(4)-A(1980)/A(1960) 0.79  0.91
"Constant Technology"
productivity in 1980:
(5)-(2)/(4)  20.84  29.80
Growth of productivity,
net of technical change:
(6)-(5)-(1)  16.15  19.11
Productivity growth explained:
by increased input (%)
(7)=(6)/(3)*100  137.17  116.33
by technical Change (Z)














ROM  YUG  USSR
2.64  3.96  8.00
6.28  9.65  15.14
3.64  5.69  7.14






39.15  ,30.49  23.22  9.81  12.22  23.66  4.51
19.29  22.50  15.57  7.17  8.26  15.66  3.05
111.29  115.68  393.18  197.05  145.08  219.28  327.90
-11.29  -15.68 -293.18  -97.05  -45.08 -119.28 -227.90
28
I w I al
m m
- --  ---  --  ---  - ---
alBulgaria  would  have  been  20.84  should  they  have  used  the  1980  input  level  but  the  1960
technology.  Thus  the  1980  "constant  technology"  productivity  in  row  5  minus  the  1960
productivity  in  row  1  is  the  net  growth  of  productivity  in  1960-1980  which  is  solely  due
to  the  alteration  of  input  level,  as  shown  in  row  6.  When  the  figure  in  row  6  is  larger
than  the  figure  in  row  3,  it  indicates  that  technical  change  had  not  brought  about  higher
productivity,  and  vice  versa.  Therefore,  the  portion  of  productivity  growth  that  can  be
explained  solely  by  increased  input  is  the  ratio  of  row  6  to  the  gross  growth  in  row  3,
as  shown  in  row  7.  And  the  unexplained  proportion  of  growth  of  productivity  is
attributable to technical change, as shown in row 8.
The  figures  in  the  last  row  of  Table  5  suggest  that  all  countries  exhibited  no  net
gain  from  technical  change.  This  implies  that  agricultural  growth  have  come  from
increased  use  of  factor  inputs  and  not  from  technical  change.  This  means  that  despite
the  fact  that  the  production  function  in  these  countries  may  have  shifted  upward  over
the  past  20  years,  the  production  point  moved  away  from  the  expansion  path  in  a  way
that  may  have  counteracted  the  benefit  of  technical  change  and  consequently  misallocated
resources.  Figures  in  Table  5  also  shown  that  Czechoslovakia,  East  Germany,  and  Hungary
have  smaller  negative  values  which  indicates  that  misallocation  of  resources  was  less
serious in these countries.8
VII. Conclusion
Several  productivity  indices  - labor,  land,  and  total  factor  productivity  measures-
are  computed  and  presented  here.  The  results  indicate  strong  upward  trends  of  labor
productivity  and  land  productivity  but  strong  downward  trends  of  total  factor
productivity  indices  in  the  1950s  and  some  upward  and  downward  trends  in  the  1970s.
Despite  the  fact  that  several  countries  appeared  to  be  able  to  regain  positive  growth  of
29total  factor  productivity  in  the  1970s,  the  divergence  between  partial  and  total  factor
productivity continued.
The  results  of  the  preceding  analysis  suggest  that  higher  labor  productivity  has
been  achieved  at  a  relatively  high  cost.  On  the  other  hand,  the  increase  in  land
productivity  indicates  that  even  though  these  countries  experienced  food  problems  and
had  large  scale  economic  reforms  in  the  last  three  decades,  they  managed  to  increase
food  production  out  of  an  almost  constant  area.  Although  increased  land  productivity
released  some  of  the  pressure  on  food  supply,  this  was  also  achieved  at  a  relatively  high
cost.
The  discouraging  aspect  is  that  there  are  sharp  decreases  in  total  factor
productivity  in  the  1950s,  continuing  through  the  1970s.  The  divergence  between  partial
and  total  factor  productivity  indicates  that  the  gain  in  labor  and  land  productivity  may
come  from  the  loss  of  total  factor  productivity.  Worse  than  that,  it  also  implies  that
inefficiency  and  unbalanced  cost  structure  are  embodied  in  the  centrally  planned
agricultural  system.  The  divergence  also  indicates  that  the  value  of  marginal  products  of
fertilizer  and  machinery  is  less  than  their  costs,  which  reduces  economic  growth  of  the
country  as  a  whole.  If  this  is  true,  then  these  countries  have  paid  a  high  cost  for  the
increases in labor and land productivity that they have achieved.
The  analyses  also  suggest  that  technical  change  has  made  little  net  contribution  to
the  process  of  agricultural  growth.  This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  there  has  been
no  technological  change  in  the  agricultural  sector.  It  is  possible  that  the  potential  gains
from  technical  change  were  wiped  out  by  the  losses  from  the  misallocation  of  resources.
It  is  also  possible  that  what  has  been  interpreted  as  technical  change  has  largely  been
the  effect  of  factor  substitution  along  a  production  function  that  has  been  shifting  at  a
relatively slow rate.
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1. Data  used  in  this  study  is  collected  from  a  large  pool  of  sources  which  include  books,
reports,  statistical  yearbooks  published  by  individuals  and  countries  as  well  as
international  organizations.  The  collected  data  then  sent  to  scholars  in  East  European
countries  for  review.  For  the  details  of  these  sources,  readers  are  referred  to,  Lung-Fai
Wong,  Agricultural  Productivity  in  the  Socialist  Countries,  (Boulder,  Westview,  1986)
Appendixes  A  and  B.  Even  with  multiple  levels  of  caution,  it  is  realized  that  data  from
these countries may has larger inaccuracy than one would normally expect.
2.  Wheat  units  are  constructed  by  taking  the  geometrical  mean  of  53  gross  agricultural
outputs  net  of  intermediate  products  weighted  by  the  relative  price  (to  wheat)  in  the
U.S.,  Japan,  and  India.  The  gross  agricultural  outputs  are  constructed  from  the  growth
index  of  individual  countries  estimated  by  USDA  and  the  annual  production  figures  from
FAO  Food  Balance  Sheets.  For  the  details  of the  construction  procedure  and  sources  of
data,  readers  are  referred  to  Lung-Fai  Wong,  Agricultural  Productivity  in  the  Socialist
Countries (Boulder, Westview,  1986), pp 125-127.
3.  All  of  the  growth  rates  reported  in  this  study  are  computed  by  estimating  a  linear
regression  of  a  natural  exponential  function,  i.e.,  log  X  =  a  + bT  where  X  is  the  variable
to be measured, T is the time variable, and b is the estimated growth rate.
4.  According  to  Vais  (1981;  239)  there  are  quite  a  few  explanations  for  the  existence  of
labor  shortages  in  the  East  European  countries.  Deficiency  in'national  planning  is  one  of
the  reasons  why  labor  plans  call  for  greater  increase  in  employment  than  is  possible.  The
second  reason  is  planners'  unfounded  optimism  with  regard  to  the  growth  of  labor
productivity.  Thus,  when  the  level  of  labor  productivity  is  lower  than  planned,  an
increase  in  labor  force  to  above  plan  level  is  necessary  in  order  to  fulfill  output  targets.
The  third  reason  is  that  enterprises  intentionally  underestimate  the  actual  labor  demand
in  order  to  get  an  easy  approval  of  their  new  investment  project.  Therefore,  labor
shortage  in  East  European  countries  is  the  result  of  creating  more  job  opportunities  than
available labor supply.
5.  Agricultural  metaproduction  function  was  estimated  using  time  series  cross-country
data.  The  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  was  selected  as  the  functional  form  for  the
socialist  agricultural  metaprodcution  function.  Other  forms  of  production  function  were
considered  and  tried  but  not  satisfactory.  Because  of  the  presence  of  multicollinearity,
special  statistical  procedures  were  employed.  Other  than  using  ordinarily  least  squares,
two  alternatives  were  considered  - principal  components  regression  and  mixed  estimation
model.  Statistically,  principal  components  regression  is  a  restricted  regression  which
provides  biased  estimators.  On  the  other  hand,  the  mixed  estimation  model  combines
results  from  earlier  studies  as  prior  information  and  the  information  provided  by  the  data
32used  in  this  study.  The  prior  information  used  in  the  mixed  estimation  model  is  the
coefficients  (Table  3,  R2)  of  the  agricultural  metaproduction  function  estimated  for  38
market  economies  (Hayami  and  Ruttan  1971;  93).  Because  of its  unbiased  characteristics,
results  of  the  mixed  estimation  (Table  3,  R10)  are  used  in  the  construction  of  total
factor productivity.
6.  For  detailed  testing  procedures,  readers  are  referred  to  Lung-Fai  Wong,  A
Comparative  Analysis  of  Agricultural  Productivity  Growth  Among  Socialist  Countries,
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis: March  1985.
7.  Data  of  agricultural  productivity  for  the  non-centrally  planned  countries  was  estimated
by  Hayami  and  Ruttan  (Hayami  and  Ruttan,  1985;  457-465).  They  used  only  male  labor  in
the  calculation  of labor  productivity.  Hence,  the  absolute  values  of  labor  productivity  may
vary  between  the  two  studies,  but  the  directions  and  trends  of  changes  should  be
essentially the same.
8.  Since  1978,  China  has  been  restructuring  the  commune  establishment  and  moving  to
less-centralized  agriculture.  The  adoption  of  Agricultural  Production  Responsibility  System
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